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1 Introduction
The aim of the paper is to illustrate how important decreasing mortality has been for demographic
change over the last century. The model used is theoretically very simple, but utilizes a fairly
detailed representation of each generations mortality and other demographic events (based on each
generation potentially living for five equally long periods). The fairly large number of periods makes
it possible to see how complex the eﬀects of mortality can be. For example, living longer means
you wish more care from your children, but this need may in part be met by their living longer
too. Within the following unified framework, the working of mortality is such that at the same
time it is possible to have income growth, fluctuating fertility (decreasing mortality can increase or
decrease fertility according to developed public old age care is), increasing education, convergence
in education between women and men and an increasing average age at birth. Despite the many
periods, it should be noted that the model is entirely recursive and fully solvable analytically.
It is notable that mortality not only has changed a great deal over the last century, but also
that there have been and still are large diﬀerences between women and men. In addition, giving
birth is one of the few activities which by necessity is segregated. It is therefore natural in a
model of mortality and fertility to attempt to include the two sexes. Doing so requires some
type of coordination between women and men concerning fertility. In the following, a simple Nash
bargaining situation is used to reconcile their wishes. The bargaining framework introduces relative
negotiation as an exogenous faktor in the model. A result due to the negotiation framework is that
an increase in the cost of children may have opposite eﬀects on the educational levels of women
and men, increasing womens’ levels and decreasing mens’.
An important aspect of the model is that most of the demographic decisions are not connected
directly to income but to use of time. Since time costs generally increase at about the same rate
as income (wages), income growth does not lead to a large increase in the desire for children. This
leaves room for other factors such as mortality and womens’ emancipation to play a large role in
determining fertility.
The model allows the analysis of the timing of births. Both decreasing mortality and increasing
influence of women generally increase the average age when giving birth. An important factor in
how these factors influence the timing of births is the discounted wage profile over each generations
life cycle. In the model this is exogeously determined through age specific experience parameters.
Changes in interest rates can also influence the wage profile and thereby the level and timing of
fertility.
The model is consistent with observed developments over the last century including fluctuations
and decline in fertility, increases in the average age of giving birth, increasing levels of education
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with lessening diﬀerences in the education levels of women and men, increasing incomes, and
increased public care for the elderly. During the last century fertility has fallen, risen, and fallen
again. At present it is at a level close to, but below, the reproduction level of 2.1 children per
women. The number of live births per women in Norway fell from 4.5 for the cohort born 1850 to
1.96 for the cohort born 1905. After this it rose again to 2.58 for the cohort born in 1934. Since
then the number of live births have fallen to 2.09 for the cohort born in 1950 and is expected to
further fall to the present total fertility rate of around 1.86.
At the same time as fertility was fluctuating, there was a large increase in the stock of human
capital. From 1962 to 1992 the proportion of 16-year-olds under education has increased from 53.8
percent to 93,5 percent and the proportion of 20-year-olds under education has increased from 16.6
percent to 43.8 percent. Women are now in the majority at universities as well as at colleges.
During the last 15 years a large literature has evolved discussing diﬀerent aspects of fertility
choice within a dynamic framework. Excellent surveys of the literature can be found in for example
Holz, Klerman and Willis (1997) or Arroyo and Zhang (1997). The paper is closely related to a
recent paper by Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), where economic and demographic outcomes are
jointly determined in a dynamic general equilibrium model of longevity, fertility and growth. The
present paper does not follow Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) in assuming longevity to be exogenous,
but extends their analysis by looking at the interaction between mortality, fertility and growth in
publicly provided old age care. The present paper shares with Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) the
assumption that parents are non-altruistic, deriving utility only from the production of children
and not the children’s welfare. In addition the present paper also includes utility derived from
the care received from children. Mortality is modelled as in Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), but
including mortality at working ages in addition to mortality at retirement age.
Another related paper discussing morality and fertility is Yakita (2001), which finds that an
increase in life expectancy lowers the fertility rate and raises life-cycle savings, and that pay-as-
you-go social security does not reverse the eﬀect on fertility. This is the result of workers wanting
more consumption as old, at the cost of reducing other consumption, including consumption of
children. In the following, decreased mortality among workers will decrease fertility, but the eﬀect
of decreased mortality among the elderly is uncertain, depending on the state of the economy.
2 The general economic environment
As mentioned in the introduction, the paper presents a two-sex overlapping-generations model that
examines how exogenous changes in mortality, the cost of children and the bargaining power of
women influence fertility, public and private care for the elderly, and the length of education taken
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by women and men.
The framework employed in the following is an overlapping-generations model of a small open
economy where individuals live for a maximum of five periods with uncertain lifetimes. All in-
dividuals face a probability of dying at diﬀerent ages. Time is discrete and indexed by t, while
generation i is defined as those born at time t = i. The age of an individual of generation i is
thereby given by t− i with ages numbered from 0 to 4.
Age 0 consists of childhood, education is taken at age 1, children are born at ages 1 and 2,
work extends over the ages from 1 to 3, and retirement is at age 4. Each child is cared for over
two periods, and parents are cared for when they reach age 4.
It should be noted that even though individuals are economically active at age 1 (taking an
education and having children) they are still being cared for by their parents since care of children
spans two periods. This is a result of the long time interval each age spans.
Production is the product of a constant returns function in real capital and skills subject to
exogenous technological progress. Skills are assumed to be the product of an age specific experience
parameter and the level of human capital. The accumulation of human capital is assumed to be
a function of earlier generations’ level of human capital and the amount of education undertaken.
Since a small open economy is assumed, the real interest rate is given exogenously by international
capital markets.
Following Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001), it is assumed that there are actuarially fair annuity
markets that distributes the savings of those who die to those who survive from one age to another.
This avoids either introducing unintended bequests to children or assuming that the savings of those
who die before reaching old age are wasted.
2.1 Negotiation and signaling
Each generation is modeled by a representative female and a representative male. Assuming equal
numbers of female and male individuals at the time of household formation, all individuals become
members of a representative household.
Diﬀering mortality and costs of bearing children lead women and men to have diﬀerent wishes
about the number of children they will have. Disagreements about such life determining decisions
are made through negotiation, with negotiation positions being determined by what the individuals
could achieve by themselves (though assuming child care is shared in the same manner as within
the union). The time cost of young children diﬀers between the sexes, both due to women’s extra
time costs connected with carrying a child and breast feeding it, and to the relative negotiation
strength of the sexes.
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Diﬀering mortality leads also to disagreements about the level of care given to their parents,
because individuals are assumed to believe that the level of care they give their parents will in turn
determine the care they themselves will receive. Government provided old age care is determined
as the average of the wishes of women and men (can be thought of as a type of voting mechanism).
Education is chosen to maximize incomes conditional on the chosen levels of fertility and private
old age care. Since educational choice maximizes income, it will be both individually and collec-
tively optimal (given fertility levels). Finally, total consumption is determined by maximizing the
couples average utility given common household budget constraints, ensuring that even though a
negotiation framework is chosen, budget constraints are observed.
In the paper, the choices a society makes about number of children and old age care is viewed
as involving negotiation and signaling based on what is individually optimal.
2.2 Keeping track of the population
Since the timing of births is one of the issues addressed in this paper, each generation is assumed
to be able to have children during two ages, age 1 and age 2. The number of children generation i
gives birth to at age 1 is denoted n1i and the number at age 2 is denoted n2i. The probability of
surviving from birth (age 0) to age k for a female child born at time t is denoted πktf and for a
male child denoted πktm. The number of persons at age k at time t is denoted Nkt. The number
of persons born into generation i will be
N0i =
N1,i−1
2
· n1,i−1 + N2,i−2
2
· n2,i−2, (1)
where N1,i−1/ 2 and N2,i−2/ 2 are the number of households having reached respectively age 1 and
age 2 in year t = i (there at two persons in each household), while n1,i−1is the number born early
to the generation having reached age 1 and n2,i−1is the number born late to the generation having
reached age 2.
Even though diﬀerences in adult female and male mortality will be prominent in the following,
for simplicity it is assumed that the number of females born equals the number of males and that
child mortality, the probability of living until age 1, is equal between the sexes (π1tf = π1tm).
At age 1 there will thereby be an equal number of females and males, who we further assume all
match into households, modeled by a representative household (individuals are also represented
by a representative female and a representative male). For further simplicity, it is assumed that
mortality does not aﬀect the couples ability to have the planned number children when they reach
age 2.
Note that the index i in the child variables n2i and n2i refer to the parents generation (time
of birth of the parents), while the index t in mortality parameters πktf and πktm refer to the
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time the child was born (one or two periods after the parents where born) and the aggregate
population variable Nkt refers to the present time. For example as generation i (those born at
time i) progresses through the ages we go from having N0i persons being born into generation i to
Nj,i+j = πjif · N0i
2
+ πjim · N0i
2
= π∗ji ·N0i
being the number of generation i surviving to age j, where the the total mortality parameter π∗kt
is defined as
π∗kt =
πktf + πktm
2
.
In the following it will be assumed that the institutional care for those reaching old age will be
provided through taxation by those who are at age 2 at that time. The dependency ratio at time
t = i,
N4i
N2i
=
π∗4,i−4N0,i−4
π∗2,i−2N0,i−2
,
therefore gives an expression of the burden of pensioners on those of working age at this time. As
one can see, it depends both on the size and the mortality of the two generations.
For later use, the proportion of parents of generation i (consisting of both young and old
parents) surviving to old age is defined as
η1i = π
∗
4,i−1 ·
n1,i−1
n1,i−1 + n2,i−2
and η2i = π
∗
4,i−2
n1,i−2
n1,i−1 + n2,i−2
,
where η2i is the proportion of parents reaching old age when generation i is at age 2 and η1i is the
proportion reaching old age when generation i is at age 3.
3 Old age care
Desired levels of care provided to parents by individuals in generation i is denoted Ei if privately
supplied and Gi if supplied indirectly by the government through taxes. Individuals derive utility
from the care they expect to receive from their children in old age. The level of care is determined
by a social contract (in the spirit of Kant) stipulating that individuals must provide to their own
parents the level of care they themselves wish to receive.
Assumption 1 (Self-referring expectations concerning children’s behavior). The social contract
between generations is such that individuals shall behave as if the level of care provided to parents
equals the level of care they will receive from their own children.
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This social contract ensures that each generation receives old age care in accordance with the
economic situation of their children. The behavior of parents can be seen as a signal of what
they expect from their children. Assumption 1 implies that the variables Ei and Gi denote both
care given and care received in the individuals decision problem. In addition it is assumed that
individuals take the implicit price of the government providing old age care as given, even though
it will be assumed to depend on wages.
The level of public care is decided by the median voting generation (those at age 2) and for
simplicity is assumed that they also pay for this care through taxes. Public care is received in any
case, while private care is only received if ones children survive long enough to take care of their
parents. Each generation is only taxed once, at age 2. Since there are perfect financial markets
and we use lump-sum taxation, it doesn’t really matter whether we collect all taxes at one age or
spread them out over diﬀerent ages.
Since the modeling of the provision of old age care is perhaps the most important part of the
model, it is discussed fairly detailed using a slightly diﬀerent notation from that used later on.
Assume that the care an individual receives in old age has two components, a physical produc-
tion component, Ephysical, and an emotional component, Eemotional. The emotional component is
produced jointly with the physical component according to the simple linear form
Eemotional = ς0 · Ephysical,
where ς is a parameter. An example would be dinner made by your children (providing Ephysical),
also giving you the enjoyment of their company (receiving an additional Eemotional). Care provided
by the government, denoted Gphysical, is only of a physical nature. If the government provides
dinner instead of the children, the elderly do not receive any emotional support.
For a person reaching age, the utility of care is given by
u∗care =

Eemotional ·
s
Π1n1 ·Π2n2
ζ1 ·

Ephysical ·
s
Π1n1 ·Π2n2
ζE 
Gphysical
ζG
ζ2
,
where ζ1, ζ2, ζE and ζG are parameters. The number of early born surviving children at this age
is denoted Π1n1 and the number of surviving late born is denoted Π2n2 (the parameters Π1 and
Π2 are the survival probabilities). The geometric weighing of the number of surviving children is
used to derive the amount of private care received from each child. This is in the spirit of the
general assumption that the utility function favors spacing children evenly instead of having all
children at one age. The consequence is that receiving care from children of diﬀering ages gives
greater utility than receiving it from children all of the same age.
The subutility of care, uE, is given by:
uE = π4 · lnu∗care .
8
Inserting from the equation for u∗care , this can be written
uE =
ζ1 + ζ2 · ζE
2
π4ig ln (Π1 ·Π2) + π4ig lnucare
where
ucare =

Eemotional ·√n1 · n2
ζ1 ·
k
Ephysical ·√n1 · n2
ζE Gphysical
ζGlζ2 .
If the parameters are constant, this implies that there is full separability between Eemotional,
Ephysical and Gphysical (so that for example ∂2 (logucare)

∂Ephysical ∂Gphysical equals zero). In the
following, non-separability between diﬀerent types of physical care is introduced at low levels of
either private or public care by assuming that the parameters ζE and ζG are not constant, but
determined by
ζE =



ζE0 + ζE1 · 11+Gp hy s i c a l if 0 ≤ Gphysical < G∗
ζE0 if Gphysical ≥ G∗
and
ζG =



ζG0 + ζG1 · 11+Ep hy s ic a l if 0 ≤ Ephysical < E∗
ζG0 if Ephysical ≥ E∗
,
where ζE0, ζE1, ζG0 and ζG1 are parameters. The cut oﬀ points G∗ and E∗ are exogenous levels
of public (private) care above which public (private) care no longer aﬀects the utility of private
(public) care. At low levels of publicly provided care, Gi−2 < G∗, the utility of private care is high.
As publicly provided care increases the variable determining the utility of private care, xi, decreases
until reaching the level ξ1. Note that Gi−2 is the amount of care being given to the generation born
in i − 4 by the generation born in i − 2. Generation i will provide Gi public care when reaching
the age of two (in period i + 2). Having xi depend on the level of care observed when born
means that this part of utility is set at birth and is not changed by the decisions of the individual.
The marginal utility of private care thereby becomes higher when there is little government care
than when government care is well established. An increase in government provided care from
a low level will decrease the marginal utility of privately provided care (∂2 (log ucare)

∂Ephysical
∂Gphysical < 0). This property will prove to be important in the later discussion of how changes in
mortality aﬀect fertility. Low levels of government care lead to a high marginal utility of private care
and indirectly of children (who provide the care). As government care is increased, the marginal
utility of children in this respect decreases.
Inserting for emotional care Eemotional and rearranging, ucare can be written as
ucare = (ζ0)
ζ1 · √n1 · n2 · Ephysical
ζ1+ζ2ζE Gphysical
ζ2ζG
Assuming that Ephysical is always larger than the threshold level X, reparameterizing and
introducing subscripts for generation, i, and for gender, g, the subutility of care, uE, can be
9
written
uE ig = ξ3ig + π4ig
kxi
2
(lnn1 + lnn2) + xi lnEig + αG lnGi
l
(2)
and
xi (Gi−3) =



ξ1 + ξ2
1
1+Gi−2
if 0 ≤ Gi−2 < X
ξ1 if Gi−2 ≥ X
, (3)
with Eig being private and Gi government provided physical care of the elderly.1 It is assumed
that the level of government care at the age a person is born (Gi−2 for a person born in period i)
determines xi. The variable xi is thereby a predetermined variable in the agents’ utility maximiza-
tion problem. This assumption introduces some simple dynamics to the model with government
care G evolving over time.
Financing of public care for the elderly is done through lump-sum taxation of individuals at
age 2. Denote p∗Gi as the price of delivering one unit of government care to one individual at time
i (consisting mainly of wages). The total cost of delivering Gi at time i + 2 to all the elderly in
the population who need care is
p∗G,i+2Gi ·N4i−1.
Since generation i numbers N2i at age 2, the tax needed to finance government care will be given
by
τ i+2 = p∗G,i+2 ·Gi ·
N4i−1
N2i
= pG, i+2 ·Gi.
where the price of delivering one unit of Gi (adjusted for the dependency ratio N4i−1/N2i ) is
given by
pG, i+2 = p
∗
G,i+2 ·
N4i−1
N2i
.
Figure 1 shows the interaction between generation i’s timeline and the timelines of the two parent
generations i − 1 and i − 2. In the figure ei denotes education and pGi+2 is the perceived price
of providing public care Gi to each elderly person in period i − 2 through a lump-sum tax. The
figure shows the number of children each of these two parent generations had, how these combine
into generation i, and gives an illustration of when care of children, care of parents, education, and
bequests occur during generation i’s lifetime.
Individual utility consists of the expected utility of consumption, the direct utility of having
children and the utility of receiving care from one’s children in old age. The subutility of old age
care for a person in generation i, uE i, is given by
uE i =
π∗3,i+1n1i
2
·Ei
xi!2
·
π∗2,i+2n2i
2
· Ei
xi!2
· (1 +Gi)αG (2)
1The reparameterization is as follows: Ephysical = Eig , Gphysical = Gi, Π1 = n∗3,i+1, Π2 = n∗2,i+2,
ξ1 = ζ1 + ζ2ζE0, ξ2 = ζ2ζE1, αG = ζ2ζG, and ξ3ig =
ζ1+ζ2·ζE
2
· π4ig · ln

n∗3,i+1 · n∗2,i+2

+ζ1 ln ζ0.
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where π∗3,i+1 · n1i is the number of children born at an early age who survive to age 3 when the
parent reaches age 4, π∗2,i+2 · n2i is the number of children born at an late age who survive to age
2 when the parent reaches age 4, and αG is a parameter.
Figure 1. Generation i’s timeline in relationship to parents’ timelines∗
t i− 2 i− 1 i i+ 1 i+ 2 i+ 3 i+ 4
i− 2
0 1 2 3 4
births ni−2,1 ni−2,,2
i− 1
0 1 2 3 4
births ni−1,1 ni−1,2
i
0 1 2 3 4
education ei
births ni1 ni2
care of children
ϕ1ni1 ϕ2ni1
ϕ1ni2 ϕ2ni2
care of parents η2iEi η1iEi
publ. old age care pGi+2Gi
∗ The subscript g has been dropped in the table
The variable xi has the same role towards determining the utility of private care as the para-
meter αG has determining the utility of public care, but in the present context it is assumed to
depend on the level of publicly provided care observed at the time an individual is born,
xi (Gi−2) =



ξ1 + ξ2 · (1 +Gi−2)−1 if 0 ≤ Gi−2 < G∗
ξ1 if Gi−2 ≥ G∗
, (3)
where G∗ is an exogenous level of public care above which public care no longer aﬀects the utility
of private care. At low levels of publicly provided care, Gi−2 < G∗, the utility of private care is
high. As publicly provided care increases the variable determining the utility of private care, xi,
decreases until reaching the level ξ1. Note that Gi−2 is the amount of care being given to the
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generation born in i− 4 by the generation born in i− 2. Generation i will provide Gi public care
when reaching the age of two (in period i + 2). Having xi depend on the level of care observed
when born means that this part of utility is set at birth and is not changed by the decisions of the
individual.
The subutility of having children, uni, is assumed to have the form
uni = (n1i)
αn!2 · (n2i)αn!2 (4)
where αn is a parameter. The total individual expected lifetime utility of the individuals of gender
g belonging to generation i, Uig, depends on consumption and the two subutility components
connected with having children and old age care. It is assumed to have the logarithmic form
Uig = ln c1i + π2igβ ln c2i + π3igβ2 ln c3i + π4igβ3 ln c4i + lnuni + π4ig lnuE i (5)
where β and αB are parameters and π4g is the probability of surviving to the fifth period (age
4). The utility function depends on the individual’s own longevity, π2ig, π3ig and π4ig, as well as
on the longevity of the individual’s female (π2i+1f , π3i+1f , π2i+2f and π3i+2f ) and male children
(π2i+1m, π3i+1m, π2i+2m and π3i+2m). Since the utility function has a Cobb-Douglas structure, it
simplifies the notation later to define the four share parameters ΛC ig, ΛNig, 2ΛE ig and ΛGig as
ΛC ig =
1
Λig

1 + π2igβ + π3igβ2 + π4igβ3

, ΛE ig =
1
Λig (π4ig · xi) ,
ΛNig =
1
Λigαn, ΛGig =
1
Λig (π4ig · αG) ,
where
Λig = 1 + π2igβ + π3igβ2 + π4igβ3 + αn + 2π4igxi + π4igαG
so that ΛC ig + ΛNig + 2ΛE ig + ΛGig = 1.
4 Care of children
At each working age (ages 1 to 3) individuals have at their disposal T hours which can be used
for work, education, taking care of children and providing private care for the elderly. Education
is taken at age 1, with the education taken by individual of type k of generation i being denoted
eik (where the subscript k denotes male or female) .
Children are cared for over two periods with the time used per child varying between the sexes
for care of young children (of age 0), but not for care of older children (children of age 1). The time
used caring for each younger child by generation i is denoted ϕ1if and ϕ1im for females and male
respectively, while the time used per older child is denoted is ϕ2i. Time usage is constant within a
generation, but can change between generations due to changes in housekeeping technologies (the
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introduction of the washing machine for example) or in the relative negotiation strength of women
and men. Time used on young children by females and males is given by
ϕ1if = ϕf + (1−Φi) · ϕ1i
ϕ1im = Φi · ϕ1i,
where ϕf is time only the female can provide (used for example for breast feeding) and ϕ1i is time
which can be shared between mothers and fathers. The parameter 0 < Φi < 1 reflects the relative
negotiating strength within the household union. An increase in Φi constitutes an increase in the
relative negotiating power of women.
The time parameters can be interpreted as net time costs, being the diﬀerence between the time
used on children and the time children themselves are productively employed in the household.
In the following, it will be supposed that the cost of older children, ϕ2i, has been increasing both
because urbanization has lead them to contribute less to the household and because of increases in
the cost of their upkeep. On the other hand it is supposed that the cost of young children faced by
women, ϕ1if , has been falling and converging towards that of men due to technological advances.
5 Education and human capital
The human capital acquired through education by an individual of gender g belonging to generation
i is denoted hig. It accrues to the individual in the period the education is taken and is determined
by the aggregate level of human capital in the previous period, h¯i−1 and the amount of education,
eig, the individual has taken. The individuals’ realized level of human capital will be
h¯ig =

h¯i−1
θ1 (e¯ig)θ2 , (6)
where θ1 and θ2 are parameters.
The level of aggregate human capital for generation i is denoted h¯i and is determined by the
previous level, h¯i−1, and the actual amount of education taken by women, e¯if , and men, e¯im,
h¯i =

h¯i−1
θ1

e¯if + e¯im
2
θ2
. (7)
In the following, we will distinguish between human capital, which in our use of the term only
takes education into account, and skills, which also take experience into account. The skill of
an individual of gender g of generation i at age j, Sjig, is assumed to be the product of an age
specific experience parameter λj and the level of human capital. An individual of generation i = t
is assumed to have the following skill levels at diﬀerent ages (at time t = i+ j),
S1ig = λ1hig, S2ig = λ2hig, S3ig = λ3hig (8)
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If the discounted value of these experience parameters increases with age for a generation born at
time i, we have:
λ1 < (1 + r)
−1 λ2 < (1 + r)
−2 λ3. (9)
The number of persons of age j at time t will be Nt−j . Letting ljig be the amount of labor
supplied by individuals of gender g belonging to cohort i at age j, the total quantity of eﬃciency-
labor employed in production at time t, Ht, is assumed to be given by:
Ht =
3[
j=1
Nt−j
[
g=f,m
lj,t−j,gSj,t−j,g −
[
g=f,m
LG2,t−2,gS2,t−2,g (10)
where
S
g=f,m L
G
2,t−j,gS2,t−2,g is the amount of eﬀective labor used by the government in providing
old care (the loss to the private sector is in eﬃciency units, while later it will be assumed that
only labor in hours worked, LG2,t−j,g, enters the production function for public old age care). In
the above skills are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production. Males and females work in
general diﬀerent hours due to time used on education and caring for children, but at age 3 they
work equal amount of hours.
6 Production and factor prices
Production Yt occurs within a period according to a standard one-sector production function F
that exhibits constant returns to scale. Letting Kt be capital, output at time t is assumed to be
given by
Yt = F (Kt,Ht) = AK
µ
t (Ht)
1−µ = Htf(kt), (11)
where kt = Kt/Ht, f(kt) = Ak
µ
t , and A and µ are parameters.
A small open economy is assumed, so that the real interest rate, r, is given exogenously by
international capital markets. The solution to the firms’ optimization problem sets factor costs
equal to their marginal productivity. For capital this gives
rt = ∂Yt/∂Kt = f 3(kt), (12)
which implies that the capital ratio kt is determined exogenously in the capital markets, kt =
rt
µA
1/(µ−1)
.
Profit maximization implies that the marginal productivity of eﬃciency-labor Ht is given by
∂Yt/∂Ht = f(kt) − ktf
3
(kt). At the disaggregated level, marginal productivity determines the
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following sequence of per capita wages for generation i (born at time t = i)
w1ig = w(r)λ1 ·

h¯i−1
θ1 (eig)θ2 ,
w2ig = w(r)λ2 ·

h¯i−1
θ1 (eig)θ2 , (13)
w3ig = w(r)λ3 ·

h¯i−1
θ1 (eig)θ2 ,
where wjig = 1Nt−j · (∂Yt/∂Ht)(∂Ht/∂lj,t−j,g) for t = i+ j is the per capita wage for individuals of
generation i at age j and w(rt) is defined by the function
w(r) = f(kt(r))− kt(r)f 3(kt(r)) = (1− µ)A (kt(r))µ = (1− µ)A

r
µA
µ/(µ−1)
.
To see how this looks at a point in time, consider for example time t = i+2 in which firms employ
the three cohorts i − 1, i and i + 1. They pay diﬀerent wages to the three cohorts based on the
cohort’s diﬀerent levels of experience and human capital in the following manner:
w1,i+1,g = w(r)λ1 ·

h¯i
θ1 (ei+1,g)θ2
w2ig = w(r)λ2 ·

h¯i−1
θ1 (eig)θ2
w3,i−1,g = w(r)λ3 ·

h¯i−2
θ1 (ei−1,g)θ2 .
In the following, the interest rate will be considered constant (but will be allowed to vary in
the proofs in the appendixes). Introducing the notation λ∗ki = (1 + r)
−(k−1) · w(r)λk discounted
wages of an individual of gender g in generation i can be written
(1 + r)−(k−1) ·wkig = λ∗ki ·

h¯i−1
θ1 (eig)θ2 .
Assuming a constant interest rate, if the discounted value of the experience parameters increases
with age as in equation (9), then λ∗1i < λ
∗
2i < λ
∗
3i.
If individuals have T hours available in each period, then the discounted value of total potential
wage income of an individual, Rig, will be
Ri =
3[
j=1
(1 + r)
−(j−1)
wji −w1i · ei (14)
= [T ∗i − λ∗1i · ei] ·

h¯i−1
θ1 (ei)θ2
where T ∗i = λ
∗
1i ·T +λ∗2i ·T +λ∗3i ·T . The variable Ri gives the value of an individual’s time during
working ages minus the time spent on education.
The variable Gi is the amount of publicly provided care provided by generation i to the elderly.
By assumption this care is provided at time i + 2 when generation i is at age 2. The generation
receiving care consists of those who at this time have reached age 4, namely generation i− 2. The
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publicly provided care to generation i − 2 at time i + 2 is provided through a linear production
function
Gi = min
%
LG2,i+2,f
(µG/ 2)
,
LG2,i+2,m
(µG/ 2)
&
so that employment is given by
LG2,i+2,k =
µG
2
·Gi, k = f,m.
To be able to entice individuals to work in the sector providing old age care, they must receive
the same wage as in the normal production sector. In addition it is assumed that there is a fixed
cost component p0G which does not change over time. We thereby have that the price of a unit
government care for the elderly is
p∗G,i+2 = p0G ·
h¯if + h¯im
2h¯i
+

w2,i+2,f +w2,i+2,m
2

µG.
The fixed cost component can play a large eﬀect at low income levels, becoming less and less
important as incomes increase. It can thereby explain low initial levels of government care. The
fixed cost component p0G is multiplied by the adjustment term (hif + him)/ 2h¯i so that all elements
in the equation relate to the same human capital notions. The adjustment term can be seen as an
index of the inequality in education between women and men,
h¯if + h¯im
2h¯i
=
(e¯if )
θ2+(e¯im)
θ2
2
e¯if+e¯im
2
θ2 .
If women and men take equal amounts of education it will equal 1 and the less equal education
is, the smaller it becomes (leading to a lower price of education). While the adjustment term is
introduced to simplify the expressions derived below, it can be argued that inequality makes it
easier to pressure part of the work force to work harder, leading to a lowering of the fixed cost
component.
At time i+2 there will be N4i−2 elderly receiving care Gi which is paid by individuals belonging
to generation i (according to the simple tax assumption made here). The total paid by each member
of generation i will be the lump-sum tax
τ i+4 =
p∗G,i+2 ·Gi ·N4i−2
N2i
= pG, i+2 ·Gi.
where pG, i+2 is defined as the implicit price of Gi as perceived by this generation,
pG, i+2 =
p∗G,i+4 ·N4i−2
N2i
=

p0G · h¯if + h¯im
2h¯i
+

w2,i+2,f +w2,i+2,m
2

µG

· N4i−2
N2i
. (15)
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7 Individual budget constraints
Letting r be the interest rate and denoting cjik as the consumption, wjik as the wages, and sjik
as the savings of individuals of gender g of generation i at age j, the individual constraints faced
by males and females of generation i can be written
c1i = w1i

T − ei − ϕ1ign1i

− s1i
c2i = w2i

T − ϕ1ign2i − ϕ2in1i − η2iEi

− pGi+2Gi + (1 + r) s1i − s2i (16)
c3i = w3i (T − ϕ2in2i − η1iEi) + (1 + r) s2i − s3i
c4i = (1 + r) s3i
where τ i = pGi+2Gi is the lump-sum tax paid for public care of the elderly. The cost of providing
public old age care to a generation is thereby met by the working population at age 2 and not just
the generation’s children.
It should be noted that in the above formulation the cost of children increases proportionally
with income (wages). It is implicitly assumed that the number of children and level of education
do not violate the time constraints.
Maximization of the individual utility functions given these individual constraints lead to males’
and females’ demand for children and care for the elderly. Negotiation then determines the realized
eﬀective demands.
For later use we define ϕ∗1ig and ϕ∗2ig as the discounted cost of having children at respectively
age 1 and age 2 divided by the level of human capital,
ϕ∗1ig =

w1igϕ1ig + (1 + r)
−1w2igϕ2

/hig (17)
ϕ∗2ig =

(1 + r)−1w2igϕ1ig + (1 + r)
−2w3igϕ2

/hig .
The total discounted cost of having children at any age will be equal to the age specific time costs,
ϕj , multiplied by the wage at the point in time the time cost is incurred.
In the same manner let η∗i be the discounted cost of taking care of ones parents
η∗i =

(1 + r)−1w2igη2i + (1 + r)
−2w3igη1i

/hig . (18)
Using the notation introduced earlier, these expressions can also be written
ϕ∗1ig = λ
∗
1iϕ1ig + λ
∗
2iϕ2i, ϕ∗2ig = λ
∗
2iϕ1ig + λ
∗
3iϕ2i,
and
η∗i = λ
∗
2i · η2i + λ∗3i · η1i.
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8 Utility maximization
In the following individual demands which establish the initial negotiating position will be termed
notional demands, while the realized demands which are determined after negotiation will be called
eﬀective demands. In particular the notional demands for children are denoted n˜1ig and n˜2ig.
Individual utility maximization leads to the conditional demand for education given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Conditional demand for education) Maximizing (5) with respect to s1i, s2i, s3i,
n1i, n2i, Ei, Gi and ei subject to the subutility equations (2), and (4), the budget constraints (16),
and the wage equations (13) leads to the demand for education
eig =
1
λ∗1i
· θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
· T ∗i , g = f,m (19)
The demand for education conditioned on the number of children chosen is given by
eig (n1i, n2i) =
θ2
λ∗1i (1 + θ2)

T ∗i −
ΛNig + 2ΛE ig
ΛNig + ΛE ig
· ϕ∗1ign1i + ϕ∗2ign2i

, g = f,m. (20)
Proof. See appendix A.
In the negotiation between females and males the number of children is determined as the
Nash bargaining solution and then equation (20) determines the education each individual takes.
Note that the above conditional demand equation for education maximizes income, and therefore
is optimal both before and after negotiation about children has taken place.
The numerator in the expression for the demand for education (19) contains the elasticity of
education on human capital, θ2, multiplied by (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig), which takes into account that
increasing wages also increase the costs of caring for children and the elderly.
The denominator 1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig) determines how much (the proportion) the value
of available working time
S3
j=1 di+1,i+j ·wjig ·T ∗i is reduced by using time on taking an education.
This can be seen by inserting equation (19) into the equation for the value of potential wage income,
Rig, given in equation (14),
Rig =
3[
j=1
di+1,i+j ·wjig · T ∗i −w1ig · eig =
1
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
3[
j=1
di+1,i+j ·wjig · T ∗i .
The notional demands for children are given in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Notional demands for children ) Maximizing (5) with respect to s1ig, s2ig, s3ig,
n1ig, n2ig, Eig, Gig and eig subject to the subutility equations (2), and (4), the budget constraints
(16), and the wage equations (13) leads to the notional demand equations for children,
n˜1ig =
1
ϕ∗1ig
· (ΛNig + ΛE ig)/ 2
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
· T ∗i , g = f,m (21)
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and
n˜2ig =
1
ϕ∗2ig
· (ΛNig + ΛE ig)/ 2
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
· T ∗i , g = f,m. (22)
Proof. See appendix A.
The notional demands for children say, as usual with Cobb-Douglas demand systems, that the
expenditure on children equal a constant budget share of income. This can be seen by rearranging
equations (21) and (22), then inserting from (17) to get

w1ikϕ1k + (1 + r)
−1w2ikϕ2
 · n˜1ik = ΛNik + ΛE ik
2
·Rig
and

(1 + r)−1w2ikϕ1k + (1 + r)
−2w3ikϕ2
 · n˜2ik = ΛNik + ΛE ik
2
·Rig.
The left hand side of these expressions is the discounted cost of having children, while the right
hand side gives the budget share.
The demand equations for children, (21) and (22), imply that increases in the costs of having
children, ϕ∗1ig and ϕ∗2ig, will decrease notional demand. Diﬀerences in the discounted costs of
having children early, ϕ∗1ig, and having them late, ϕ∗2ig, determine the distribution between early
born and late born children. The fact that women experience higher costs than men (ϕ∗jif > ϕ
∗
jim),
will in isolation lead to women wanting fewer children than men. On the other hand, as will be
seen later, the parameters of the utility function (especially if the relative size of x i is large and
πi+4,f > πi+4,m) can counteract this eﬀect. If x i is small enough, ϕ1if is larger than ϕ1im and
πi+4,f is larger than πi+4,m, then women will always want less children than men, n˜jif < n˜jim.
The conditional demand for private care of elderly and the demand for public care of the elderly
is given in lemma 3..
Lemma 3 (Demand for private and public care of the elderly ) Maximizing (5) with re-
spect to s1ig, s2ig, s3ig, n1ig, n2ig, Eig, Gig and eig subject to the subutility equations (2), and
(4), the budget constraints (16), and the wage equations (13) leads to the conditional demand
equation for privately provided old age care
Eig (n1i, n2i) =
1
η∗i
· ΛE ig
ΛNig + ΛE ig
· ϕ∗1ign1ig + ϕ∗2ign2ig

, g = f,m, (23)
(conditional on the number of children) and the demand equation for publicly provided old age care
G˜ig =
1
pG, i+2
· ΛGig
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
· T ∗i ·

h¯i−1
θ1
(eig)
θ2 , g = f,m. (24)
Proof. See appendix A.
Privately provided care is determined along with number of children and education in the
negotiation process between females and males. The demand for publicly provided old age care
will be determined by a type of voting mechanism.
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9 Bargaining
It is assumed that the eﬀective (actual) demand for children is the outcome of negotiation between
the sexes. As mentioned in the introduction, negotiation between the sexes is based on the notional
demands for children found in the previous section. The couple negotiate on the basis of these
notional demands, agreeing on the number of children they wish to have; their collective eﬀective
demand for children.
Individuals wish to minimize the distance between the agreed upon number of children born at
time j and their notional demand, n˜jig:
min
nji
(n˜jig − nji)2 , j = 1, 2, g = f,m.
The Nash product gives the nji that is the solution to the bargaining problem
min

(n˜jif − nji)2
Φ∗fi 
(n˜jim − nji)2
Φ∗mi
, j = 1, 2,
where Φ∗mi is a parameter reflecting the negotiation strength of males and Φ
∗
fi the negotiation
strength of females.
The eﬀective demand for children born early, n¯1i, is then given by
n¯1i = Φin˜1if + (1−Φi) n˜1im
and for children born later in life
n¯2i = Φin˜2if + (1−Φi) n˜2im
where Φi = Φ∗fi
1
Φ∗fi +Φ
∗
mi

. The realized number of children, n¯ji, is the weighted average of
the desires of the male and the female weighted with their relative bargaining power.
Lemma 4 (Eﬀective demand for children) The realized number of births determined by the
Nash product is given by
n¯1i = Ω1i · T ∗i (25)
n¯2i = Ω2i · T ∗i (26)
with
Ω1i =
Φi
2ϕ∗1if
· ΛNif + ΛE if
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNif − 2ΛE if )
+
1−Φi
2ϕ∗1im
· ΛNim + ΛE im
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNim − 2ΛE im)
=
[
g=f,m
Φig
2ϕ∗1ig
·

 (αn + π4ig · x (Gi−2))
(1 + θ2)

1 +
S4
j=2 πjigβ
j−1 + π4ig · αG

+ αn + 2π4ig · x (Gi−2)


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and
Ω2i =
Φi
2ϕ∗2if
· ΛNif + ΛE if
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNif − 2ΛE if )
+
1−Φi
2ϕ∗2im
· ΛNim + ΛE im
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNim + 2ΛE im)
=
[
g=f,m
Φig
2ϕ∗2ig
·

 (αn + π4ig · x (Gi−2))
(1 + θ2)

1 +
S4
j=2 πjigβ
j−1 + π4ig · αG

+ αn + 2π4ig · x (Gi−2)


where Φif = Φi and Φim = 1−Φi.
Proof. Follows directly by inserting for notional demands from equations (21) and (22) into
the Nash bargaining equations for n¯1i and n¯2i above.
An increase in the relative negotiation strength of women, Φi, will have two eﬀects. One is
to shift some of the cost of having children towards men (as mentioned above, ϕ1if will decrease
and ϕ1im will increase when Φi increases), increasing the number of children women want and
decreasing the number men want. The other is to give the preferences of the female more weight.
The number of children given by the bargaining process determines education and the demand
for old age care of females and males as given in equations (20) and (23):
e¯ig = eig (n¯1i, n¯2i) =
θ2
λ∗1i (1 + θ2)
T ∗i

1− ΛNig + 2ΛE ig
ΛNig + ΛE ig
· ϕ∗1igΩ1i + ϕ∗2igΩ2i

, g = f,m.
(27)
and
E¯ig = Eig (n¯1i, n¯2i) =
1
η∗i
T ∗i ·
ΛE ig
ΛNig + ΛE ig
· ϕ∗1igΩ1i + ϕ∗2igΩ2i

, g = f,m,
with
ΛNig + 2ΛE ig
ΛNig + ΛE ig
=
αn + 2 · π4ig · x (Gi−2)
αn + π4ig · x (Gi−2)
ΛE ig
ΛNig + ΛE ig
=
π4ig · x (Gi−2)
αn + π4ig · x (Gi−2)
being dependent on the variable xi = x (Gi−2).
The realized level of government provided care delivered to generation i − 2 by generation i,
G¯i, is assumed to be determined as the average of male and female notional demands weighted
by their relative human capital levels,
G¯i =
1
2
#
G˜if ·

h¯if + h¯im

2
hif
+ G˜im ·

h¯if + h¯im

2
him
$
(28)
where
G˜ig =
1
pG, i+2
· ΛGig
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
· T ∗i · h¯ig, g = f,m.
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This can be viewed as a type of mean voter theorem where negotiation strength plays no role.
Replacing the individual human capital levels, hif and him, by the average level of the generation,

h¯if + h¯im

2, is a normalization done for simplicity.
Lemma 5 (Eﬀective demand for public old age care) Interpreting equation (28) as a vot-
ing mechanism, the eﬀective supply of public old age care is given by
G¯i =
1
p0G
h¯i
+w(ri+2)λ2 · µG
· T ∗i ·
N2i
N4i−2
·
[
g=f,m
1
2
·

ΛGig
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)

(29)
with
ΛGig
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
=
π4ig · αG
(1 + θ2)

1 + π2igβ + π3igβ2 + π4igβ3 + π4igαG

+ αn + 2π4igxi (Gi−2)
.
Proof. Inserting equations (15) and (24) into (28) gives the above.
Finally, it is assumed that given the levels of children, education, and private and public old
age care determined through negotiation and voting, the couple maximizes average utility subject
to household budget constraints that are the sum of the individual constraints. These levels of
consumption are not the main interest of the paper and will not be commented further. This final
stage is important only in that it ensures that even though signaling, negotiation and voting have
been introduced to the model, the budget constraints of the individuals will be observed.
10 Dynamics
The dynamics of the model is determined by the following three equations
log h¯i = θ1 log h¯i−1 + θ2 log (Γi (x (Gi−2))) (30)
N0i =
N1,i−1
2
· Ω1,i−1 (Gi−3)T ∗i−1 +
N2,i−2
2
·Ω2,i−2 (Gi−4)T ∗i−2, (31)
log G¯i = log

 [
g=f,m
T ∗i ·
1
2
· ΛGig
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)


− log

p0G
h¯i
+w(ri+2)λ2 · µG

+ logN2i − logN4i−2 (32)
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with
Γi (x (Gi−2)) =
θ2
λ∗1i (1 + θ2)
· T ∗i
·

1−

1
2
[
g=f,m
αn + 2 · π4ig · x (Gi−2)
αn + π4ig · x (Gi−2) · ϕ
∗
1ig

 · Ω1i
−

1
2
[
g=f,m
αn + 2 · π4ig · x (Gi−2)
αn + π4ig · x (Gi−2) · ϕ
∗
2ig

 · Ω2i


The human capital equation (30) is derived by inserting the equation for education, (27),
into the equation for aggregate human capital, (7). It is easily seen that ∂Ωji/ ∂x > 0 and
∂Γi/ ∂x < 0 as long as own consumption of goods matters more than children in the utility
function: 1 +
S4
j=2 πjigβ
j−1 > αn (this is a suﬃcient, but not a necessary condition). At low
levels, increases in Gi will decrease the utility of private care by decreasing xi and thereby increase
Γi. Define the minimum level of Γi (x (Gi−2)) as Γmin = Γi (ξ1 + ξ2) and the maximum level as
Γ∗ = Γi (ξ1).
The population equation (31) is found by inserting the child equations (25) and (26) into the
aggregate population equation (1).
Equation (32) is the logarithm of the public old age care equation (29). It gives the development
in public old age care. Note that big swings in the population will result in changes in public old
age care through a price eﬀect. Remember that G¯i denotes care per person, while total care will
be the number of elderly times the amount of care given to each person, N4i−2 · G¯i.
Equation (3) discussed earlier is also important, stating how utility of private health care
changes as public health care is expanded.
The human capital equation (30) is a first order diﬀerence equation with a time-varying constant
term (θ2 logΓi). It is well known (see for example Gandolfo (1997) that in general the long run
equilibrium state is a moving equilibrium given by
log h¯∗i =
∞[
t=0
(θ1)
t · θ2 lnΓi−t.
Note that the long run equilibrium state can never be smaller than hmin = θ2 lnΓmin

(1− θ1),
since this would be the equilibrium level if Γi always stayed at its lower bound.
The aim of the model is to highlight how developments during the last century can be explained
by transitional dynamics brought on by the introduction of public health care for the elderly. It
is therefore natural in the present context to restrict the analysis to the case where the eﬀects of
increasing public care of the elderly die out as the level of human capital increases. A suﬃcient
condition for this is assumption 2.
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Assumption 2. It is assumed that G∗ is set so that
G∗ ≤
 p0G
hmin
+w(ri+2)λ2 · µG
−1
· T ∗i ·Nmin
·
[
g=f,m
1
2
·
#
π4ig · αG
(1 + θ2)

1 + π2igβ + π3igβ2 + π4igβ3 + π4igαG

+ αn + 2π4ig (ξ1 + ξ2)
$
with N2iN4i−2 being bounded below by N
min.
Since h¯i at some point must reach at least its minimum equilibrium level hmin, Gi must under
assumption 2 at some point become larger than G∗. As soon as Gi becomes equal to G∗, Γi
becomes a constant and the human capital relationship becomes a first order diﬀerence equation
with a time invariant constant term with equilibrium state
log h¯∗ =
θ2 lnΓ∗
1− θ1
.
Having assumed that 0 < θ1 < 1, the equilibrium is stable and as long as log h¯0 < log h¯∗ there
will be a monotonic convergence of human capital towards the the equilibrium level. In this case
human capital will be growing over time. The larger θ1 is, the larger this growth will be. Galor
and Tsiddon (1997) assume that θ1 is a decreasing function of h so that one can have an increasing
growth rate at low level of human capital (θ1 > 1), and a decreasing rate at high levels (θ1 < 1).
In the situation whereGi−2 ≥ G∗ (xi = ξ1) the variables Γi, Ω1i, Ω2i and ΛGig/ (1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig
−2ΛE ig)) all become constants. This in turn means that the number of children, n¯1i + n¯2i, born
to each generation is constant. The population then grows if n¯1i + n¯2i > 2, falls if n¯1i + n¯2i < 2,
and converges to a stable population if n¯1 + n¯2 = 2. If the size of the population in the two
periods preceding the initial periods are diﬀerent, then the relative size of cohorts will oscillate
before approaching a constant value. At this point the population may grow as a whole, but the
relative distribution between diﬀerent age groups remains fixed.
Even though assumption 2 assures us of a long term time invariant equilibrium state, an
exogenous shock that leads to a sudden decrease in N2iN4i−2 can lead to complex dynamics in the
shorter term (notice that Γi is a function of all the parameters in the model). Population size can
begin to oscillate and G¯i can change rapidly (remember it is care per person). If this also changes
xi then the development in human capital is also aﬀected.
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11 Changes in mortality, bargaining power of women and
the cost of children
Decreasing mortality in old age (increasing longevity π4ig) has two eﬀects on the notional demand
for children. The wish for more consumption in the last period will lead to fewer children, while
the wish for more care will lead to more children.
Proposition 1 (Falling mortality in old age) Falling mortality in old age (increased longevity
π4ig) will increase the number of children born if
1 + π2igβ + π3igβ2 >
#
β3 + αG

xi
+
1
(1 + θ2)
$
αn,
otherwise falling mortality will decrease the number of children. A suﬃciently low utility of private
old age care xi will lead to falling mortality decreasing the number of children born. If the number
of children increases when mortality drops, the amount of education taken by women and men
decreases, otherwise it will increase.
Proof. The fertility result follows directly from derivation of Ωji with respect to π4ig, while
the education result is easily seen by considering how fertility aﬀects the education function (27).
If receiving care when old is not appreciated (xi = αG = 0), then a decrease in mortality
(increase in longevity) leads to an increase in the desire for consumption at age 4 and thereby a
decrease in the number of children. Individuals reallocate resources away from children toward
consumption in the last period. On the other hand, if care when old is the only aspect of children
one cares about (αn = 0), then a decrease in mortality (increase in longevity) makes receiving care
when old more important, leading to an increase in the number of children. In this case individuals
reallocate resources towards children.
That the eﬀect of mortality on fertility depends on the amount of old age care delivered by the
government can give an interesting interpretation of the development in fertility during the 20th
century. As noted in the introduction, in Norway births first decreased, then increased and finally
started decreasing again. If early in the last century xi was large (due to a lack of government
provided old age care), decreasing mortality would lead to an increase in the number of children.
To begin it could be argued that this eﬀect was counteracted by the eﬀect of increasing child costs
(especially increases in the cost of older children, ϕ2i), but over time it would come to dominate
and births would start to increase. If then xi shifted downward as more old age care was provided
by government, the eﬀect of decreasing mortality would be reversed, leading to a decrease in births.
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Proposition 2 (Falling mortality among those of working age) Falling mortality among those
of working age (increased longevity π2ig or π3ig) will always decrease the number of children born
and increase the amount of education taken by women and men.
Proof. Follows from derivation of Ωji and considering how a decrease in children aﬀects the
education function (27).
Falling mortality in working age will increase the expected utility of consumption so that indi-
viduals increase consumption and reduce the number of children they have. Higher life expectancy
raises the return to human capital, so that it is in the interest of the agents to allocate less time to
children and more time on education. There is no income eﬀect due to the assumption that there
are actuarially fair annuity markets. Under this assumption an increase in expected wage income
due to falling mortality is canceled by a decrease in annuity payments to those surviving from one
age to another.
Proposition 3 (Increased bargaining power for women) An increase in the bargaining power
of women, Φi, will decrease the number of children born if women have a smaller notional demand
for children than men, n˜jif < n˜jim, and if
ϕ∗jif
ϕ∗jim + ϕ∗jif
> Φi,
where
ϕ∗1if
ϕ∗1im + ϕ∗1if
=
λ∗1iϕf + λ
∗
1iϕ1i + λ
∗
2iϕ2i −Φi · λ∗1iϕ1i
λ∗1iϕf + λ
∗
1iϕ1i + 2λ
∗
2iϕ2i
and
ϕ∗2if
ϕ∗2im + ϕ∗2if
=
λ∗2iϕf + λ
∗
2iϕ1i + λ
∗
3iϕ2i −Φi · λ∗2iϕ1i
λ∗2iϕf + λ
∗
2iϕ1i + 2λ
∗
3iϕ2i
.
If an increase in Φi decreases the demand for children, the amount of education taken by women
and men, e¯if and e¯im, will increase.
Proof. Derivation of n¯ji with respect to bargaining power leads to
∂n¯ji
∂Φi
=
#
1 +
Φi
ϕ∗jif
· λ∗jiϕ1i
$
· n˜1if −
#
1 +
(1−Φi)
ϕ∗jim
· λ∗jiϕ1i
$
· n˜1im
and the proposition is easily seen to hold.
Women will always wish fewer children than men if there is no mortality diﬀerence between
women and men at working ages, if there is little government provided old age care so that xi
is small enough, if women face higher costs of having children, ϕ∗jf > ϕ
∗
jm, and if women have a
higher probability of reaching old age, π4if > π4im. At low levels of female bargaining power, it is
safe to assume that the relative weight of female child bearing costs, ϕ∗jif
1
ϕ∗jim + ϕ∗jif

, will be
higher than the bargaining parameter Φi.
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In other words, early increases in the bargaining power of women would seem to lead to fewer
children being born, but as government provides increasing levels of care for the elderly and bar-
gaining power reaches higher levels, there is an increased possibility that increased bargaining
power can lead to more children.
The cost of having older children, ϕ2i, can increase both due to falling economic benefits
of having older children (they do less household work) or increasing costs (care becoming more
expensive) of having older children.
Proposition 4 (Increased costs of children) An increase in the cost of having older children,
ϕ2i, will lead to a fall in the number of births, n¯i. If women use more time taking care of young
children than men, an increase in the cost of older children ϕ2i will increase the amount of education
taken by women, e¯if , and decrease the amount taken by men, e¯im.
Proof. It is easily seen that
∂(1/ϕ∗1ig)
∂ϕ2i
< 0 and
∂( 1/ϕ∗2ig)
∂ϕ2i
< 0 and it then follows from the
equations for children (25) and (26) that the number of children must fall.
Women and men use equal time on young children if the bargaining parameter is as follows:
ϕ1if = ϕ1im
ϕf + (1−Φi) · ϕ1i = Φi · ϕ1i
Φi =
1
2

1 +
ϕf
ϕ1i

>
1
2
From the equation for education (27) it can be seen women will increase their education if
∂
 ϕ∗1if
ϕ∗1im
!
∂ϕ2i < 0 and ∂
 ϕ∗2if
ϕ∗2im
!
∂ϕ2i < 0.
From the derivatives one finds that these conditions are satisfied only if women take more care of
children than men,
Φi <
1
2

1 +
ϕf
ϕ1i

.
For men, the relationships are reversed, so that men increase their education if
∂
#
ϕ∗1im
ϕ∗1if
$/
∂ϕ2i < 0 and ∂
#
ϕ∗2im
ϕ∗2if
$/
∂ϕ2i < 0,
taking less education if women take more care of children than men.
This lemma gives as an interesting result that increases in the cost of older children (including
reduced benefit of work done by older children) leads to women increasing their education and
men reducing theirs. As such, it provides an argument for the convergence of educational levels
between women and men. Note that for women and men to devote the same amount of time to
young children, women must have more bargaining power than men.
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The result is due to child costs only being modeled as time costs and to having fertility de-
termined within a negotiating framework. This leads to relative time costs being important in
the eﬀective demands for education, while playing no roll in the nominal demand functions. In
the nominal demand for education the number of children one wants is proportional to the cost
of taking care of these children. An increase in the cost of older children reduces the demand of
men more than women, but the negotiating framework does not allow men to reduce the number
of children as much as they want. This implies that men’s total time spent on children increases
(the number of children they have is reduced by less than the cost of children) and that women’s
total time spent on children decreases (the number of children is reduced by more than the cost of
children).
Finally, our model lets us look closer at how mortality and bargaining power influence the
spacing of children. In the following, average age when giving birth will be considered, defined as
1 · n¯1i + 2 · n¯2i
n¯1i + n¯2i
= 1 +
1
1 + n¯1in¯2i
.
Note that the an increase in a parameter z will increase the average age of women giving birth if
∂

n¯1i
n¯2i

∂z
< 0 ⇐⇒
∂n¯1i
∂z
n¯1i
<
∂n¯2i
∂z
n¯2i
.
Proposition 5 (Changes in average age when giving birth) More children will be born early
than late (n¯1i > n¯2i) if ϕ∗1ig < ϕ∗2ig which will always be the case if discounted wages increase over
time
w1ig < (1 + r)
−1
w2ig < (1 + r)
−2
w3ig.
An equal marginal increase in old age longevity π4ig for women and men (falling mortality) will
increase average age when giving birth as long as women live longer than men,
π4if > π4im.
Increased bargaining power for women increases the average age when giving birth as long as men’s
notional demand for children is larger than women’s and discounted wages rise more strongly at
age 3 than at age 2,
(1 + r)
−1
w3ig
w2ig
>
(1 + r)−1w2ig
w1ig
.
Proof. See appendix B.
The model thereby has that increases in longevity and increased bargaining power for women
leads to an increase in the average age when giving birth, as one has observed in many western
countries. An important assumption behind this result is that individuals face increasing wages over
the life time, which has been modeled using the age specific experience parameters λj . According
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to the model, changes in the return to experience (or in interest rates) can reverse our findings on
the timing of births.
12 Conclusions
The paper has used a very simple combination of an overlapping generations model and Nash
bargaining among spouses to analyze the factors that can aﬀect the number and timing of children.
The model is able to explain changes in fertility as being the result of the net cost of having children,
the utility of being cared for by ones children when one is old, and the bargaining strength of women
in marriage.
The stylized facts discussed earlier can now be explained using the above model. Early in
the century the benefits of having older children were decreasing fast due to fewer people living
on farms in rural environments, leading to a decrease in the number of children. As this eﬀect
tapered oﬀ, declining mortality and a high utility of receiving care from one’s children lead to the
number of children rising again. Finally a fall in the utility of receiving care from one’s children
and increasing bargaining power among women lead to a further fall in fertility.
The increased bargaining power of women combined with less returns to seniority have recently
lead to a delay of births. Education and the level of human capital have been increasing throughout
the last century. As a result of the increasing time cost of older children and of time costs of young
children falling more rapidly for women than for men, the educational level of women has been
approaching that of men.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemmas 1, 2 and 3
Proof. In the following we expand slightly on the model in the main part of the paper by
introducing assuming that the production function is subject to exogenous technological progress
through a technological coeﬃcient ψt, reflecting labor augmenting technological change at time
t. The technological coeﬃcient is an externality that is not taken into account by the firms or
individuals when they maximize profits and utility. The production function will thereby be
Yt = F (Kt,ψtHt) = AK
µ
t (ψtHt)
1−µ
= ψtHtf(kt).
In addition variable interest rates are allowed. To simplify the notation, the interest operator
dij = (1 + ri)
Tj
k=i(1 + rk)
−1 is used. The optimization problem is:
max Ui = ln c1i + π2igβ ln c2i + π3igβ2 ln c3i + π4igβ3 ln c4i + π4ig · xi lnEi
+ αn+πˆ4ig·xi2 lnn1i +
αn+πˆ4ig·xi
2 lnn2i + π4ig · αG ln (1 +Gi)
+ π4igxi2 ln

π∗2,i+2·π∗3i+1
2

w.r.t s1i, s2i, s3i, ei, n1i, n2i, Ei, Gi
s.t. c1i = w1i

T − ei − ϕ1ign1i

− s1i
c2i = w2i

T − ϕ1ign2i − ϕ2in1i − η2iEi

− pG,i+2Gi + (1 + ri+2) s1i − s2i
c3i = w3i (T − ϕ2in2i − η1iEi) + (1 + ri+3) s2i − s3i
c4i = (1 + ri+4) s3i
w1i = ψi+1w(ri+1)λ1 ·

h¯i−1
θ1 (ei)θ2
w2i = ψi+2w(ri+2)λ2 ·

h¯i−1
θ1 (ei)θ2
w3i = ψi+3w(ri+3)λ3 ·

h¯i−1
θ1 (ei)θ2
The first order conditions for s1i, s2i and s3i can be written
c2i =
π2igβ
di+1,i+2
c1i, c3i =
π3igβ
2
di+1,i+3
c1i, c4i =
π4igβ
3
di+1,i+4
c1i.
Inserting these first order conditions into the discounted value of total expected consumption
Di = c1i + di+1,i+2c2i + di+1,i+3c3i + di+1,i+4c4i leads to
Di =

1 + π2igβ + π3igβ2 + π4igβ3

c1i.
Inserting the budget constraints for c1i, c2i, c3i and c4i into Di leads to
Di =

1 + π2igβ + π3igβ2 + π4igβ3

c1i
=

h¯i−1
θ1 (ei)θ2

T ∗i − λ∗1i · ei − ϕ∗1ign1i − ϕ∗2ign2i − η∗iEi

− pG,i+2Gi. (A.1)
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Inserting from the first order conditions for s1i, s2i and s3i into the first order conditions for ei,
n1i, n2i, Ei and Gi leads to the following five first order conditions
ei =
θ2
λ∗1i (1 + θ2)

T ∗i − ϕ∗1ign1i − ϕ∗2ign2i − η∗iEi

(A.2)
n1i =
αn + π4ig · xi
2
· 1
ϕ∗1ig
· h¯i−1
−θ1 (ei)−θ2 c1i (A.3)
n2i =
αn + π4ig · xi
2
· 1
ϕ∗2ig
· h¯i−1
−θ1 (ei)−θ2 c1i (A.4)
Ei = π4igxi · 1η∗i
· h¯i−1
−θ1 (eig)−θ2 c1i (A.5)
Gi = π4igαG · 1
pG, i+1
· c1i (A.6)
which together with equation (A.1) give six equations in the six variables c1i, ei, n1i, n2i, Ei and
Gi. From equations A.3 and A.4 we get
c1i =

h¯i−1
θ1 (ei)θ2
αn + π4ig · xi ·

ϕ∗1ign1i + ϕ
∗
2ign2i

which inserted into the first order condition for Ei gives the conditional demand for old age care
Ei (n1i, n2i) =
1
η∗i
· π4igxi
αn + π4ig · xi ·

ϕ∗1ign1i + ϕ
∗
2ign2i

. (20)
Inserting this into the first order condition for education we get that the conditional demand for
education can be written
ei (n1i, n2i) =
θ2
λ∗1i (1 + θ2)

T ∗i −
αn + 2π4igxi
αn + π4ig · xi ·

ϕ∗1ign1i + ϕ
∗
2ign2i

. (17)
Solving the six equations (A.1) - (A.6) with respect to c1i, ei, n1i, n2i, Ei and Gi leads to the
demand functions
c1i =
1
Λig

h¯i−1
θ1 (ei)θ2 (T ∗i − λ∗1i · ei)
ei =
1
λ∗1i
· θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
· T ∗i (16)
n1i =
1
ϕ∗1ig
· (ΛNig + ΛE ig)/ 2
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
· T ∗i (18)
n2i =
1
ϕ∗2ig
· (ΛNig + ΛE ig)/ 2
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
· T ∗i (19)
Ei =
1
η∗i
· ΛE ig
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
· T ∗i
Gi =
1
pG, i+1
· ΛGig
1 + θ2 (1− ΛNig − 2ΛE ig)
· h¯i−1
θ1 (ei)θ2 · T ∗i . (21)
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. That the condition ϕ∗1ig < ϕ∗2ig is necessary for more early than late births is seen from
the demand functions for children. Inserting for ϕ∗2ig and ϕ∗1ig in ϕ∗2ig > ϕ∗1ig and multiplying by the
individuals human capital level leads to

(1 + r)−1w2ig −w1ig

·ϕ1ig >

(1 + r)
−1
w2ig − (1 + r)−2w3ig

·ϕ2i.
That increasing longevity increases average age at birth can be seen by inserting in the expression
∂n¯1i
∂π4i
n¯1i
<
∂n¯2i
∂π4i
n¯2i
and rearranging to find the condition
x
(αn + π4im · x) +
(1 + θ2)

β3 + αG

+ 2x
(1 + θ2)

1 +
S4
j=2 πjimβ
j−1 + π4im · αG

+ αn + 2π4im · x
>
x
(αn + π4if · x) +
(1 + θ2)

β3 + αG

+ 2x
(1 + θ2)

1 +
S4
j=2 πjifβ
j−1 + π4if · αG

+ αn + 2π4if · x
which is always the case as long as π4if > π4im.
Finally, the eﬀect of increased bargaining power for women (increased Φi) is found in the same
manner, leading to the expression
a1f

1 +
Φin˜2if
(1−Φi) n˜2im

− a2f
#
ϕ∗2im
ϕ∗1im
· ϕ
∗
1if
ϕ∗2if
+
Φin˜2if
(1−Φi) n˜2im
$
< a1m
#
ϕ∗2im
ϕ∗1im
· ϕ
∗
1if
ϕ∗2if
+
(1−Φi) n˜1im
Φin˜1if
$
− a2m

1 +
(1−Φi) n˜1im
Φin˜1if

where
a1f =

1
Φi +
λ∗1i
ϕ∗1if
· ϕ1i

a1m =

1
(1−Φi) +
λ∗1i
ϕ∗1im
· ϕ1i

a2f =

1
Φi +
λ∗2i
ϕ∗2if
· ϕ1i

a2m =

1
(1−Φi) +
λ∗2i
ϕ∗2im
· ϕ1i

.
Since it is apparent that (1−Φi)n˜1imΦin˜1if >
Φin˜2if
(1−Φi)n˜2im as long as n˜kim > n˜kif (assuming Φ < 0, 5) and
easily established that (a1f − a2f ) < (a1m − a2m), a suﬃcient condition for the above expression
to be true is that
ϕ∗2im
ϕ∗1im
>
ϕ∗1if
ϕ∗2if
which is the case if
(1 + r)−1w3ig
w2ig
>
(1 + r)−1w2ig
w1ig
.
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